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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.   
 
 
         Appellant John Cocivera and six corporations that he 
established were convicted by a jury of various crimes arising 
out of a scheme to defraud Medicare.  The principal issues before 
us concern Cocivera's waiver of his right to counsel and his 
representation of the defendant corporations.   
                                I. 
         Cocivera was the chief executive officer and fifty  
percent owner of six Pennsylvania corporations that were created 
in August 1989 to provide medical equipment to Medicare 
beneficiaries through a national telemarketing operation.  
Cocivera and the corporations were indicted in September 1994 in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on one hundred forty-four (144) counts of mail fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, twenty-eight (28) counts of 
filing false Medicare claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, ten 
(10) counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i), twenty-two (22) counts of engaging in money 
transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), and one count 
of structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).  The government alleged, 
inter alia, that the defendants engaged in telemarketing to 
senior citizens using false and misleading statements, sent 
preprinted certificates of medical necessity (CMNs) containing 
false and misleading statements to physicians' offices, altered 
certificates of medical necessity from physicians, made false 
statements to senior citizens at the time of delivery in order to 
secure assignment of Medicare payments, submitted false claims to 
Pennsylvania Blue Shield, and made false and misleading 
statements to physicians, Medicare and administrative law judges 
to forestall complaints and make apprehension less likely.     
         Cocivera and U.S. Health Products, Inc., the umbrella 
company, were found guilty of all 205 counts by a jury in May 
1995.  Each of the other corporations was convicted, although on 
a lesser number of counts than charged.  Cocivera was sentenced 
to a 78 month prison term, a three year term of supervised 
release, and a special assessment of $10,250.  The corporate 
defendants received assessments totalling $77,000.  The 
defendants filed timely notices of appeal; we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                               II. 
         The attorney originally retained by the defendants 
withdrew more than five months before the trial began and the 
court appointed Thomas Bergstrom, a well known criminal lawyer, 
to represent all the defendants.  At the start of the second day 
of trial, and after four witnesses had testified, Cocivera asked 
to address the court without the jury.  The court gave him that 
opportunity.  Cocivera began by stating that he found Bergstrom 
to be "a very intelligent and very capable attorney," and that 
"I'm thankful I have him as an attorney."  App. at 98.  Cocivera 
then proceeded to make various complaints about Bergstrom's 
performance.  Id. at 99-103.  Although Bergstrom had spent nine 
or ten hours with Cocivera in the course of his preparation, 
Cocivera complained that the time Bergstrom spent with him was 
inadequate, complained that Bergstrom declined to interview 
certain persons or to file certain motions that Cocivera wished 
to file, such as for a continuance, and complained about various 
decisions made by Bergstrom which were, in essence, elements of 
Bergstrom's trial strategy, such as his cross-examination.  
         Cocivera then asked the court three questions: first, 
if he could file motions, second, if he could have a continuance 
or, third, if he would be allowed to act as co-counsel so that he 
"may ask some questions of the witnesses that I feel are very 
pertinent . . . .  I just want to get to the facts as I think 
they should be brought out."  Id. at 104. 
         The district court heard from Bergstrom who explained 
the trial preparation that he had done and his reason for 
declining to file the motions referred to by Cocivera.  In 
addition, although Bergstrom had not examined all the many files 
to which Cocivera had referred, he had spent some three hours 
looking through those documents, he had also reviewed the 300 
government exhibits, reviewed all the Jencks material pertaining 
to the 30 government witnesses, and planned to review the 
remaining documents with the services of an accountant.  Id. at 
105-106.  Bergstrom explained that he believed "that this case 
requires simplification and not more complexity."  Id. at 106.  
He concluded that in spite of the difference in approach he and 
Cocivera had, "I'm prepared to continue."  Id.  The court then 
heard from the government lawyer who argued that it would be 
inappropriate for Cocivera to serve as co-counsel and who opposed 
all of Cocivera's requests. 
         The district court then ruled that Cocivera could "file 
whatever motions he wishes and I will take a look at them."  Id.at 113.  
With respect to Cocivera's complaints about Bergstrom, 
the district court found that Bergstrom had proceeded 
conscientiously and expressed confidence that he would do so 
throughout the trial.  The court concluded: "Mr. Bergstrom is at 
the very top of his profession . . . .  If [he] isn't doing an 
adequate job, we simply don't have the talent to handle this case 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania."  Id. at 114.  The 
court, noting the difficulties of hybrid representation, declined 
to allow Cocivera to serve as co-counsel, stating "although I 
find that there is no good cause for defendant's dissatisfaction 
with Mr. Bergstrom, he, the defendant, Mr. Cocivera does have a 
constitutional right to represent himself if he wishes."  Id.  
         The court then asked Cocivera if he wanted the court to 
conduct the required colloquy on the issue, but Cocivera asked if 
he could wait until the end of the day or the next day to see how 
counsel performed.  The court insisted that Cocivera decide 
whether he wanted to represent himself, and Cocivera replied, 
"Yes, I guess I do," id. at 115, whereupon the court conducted 
the colloquy, consisting of a series of questions concerning his 
knowledge of law, his experience representing himself or others 
in a criminal trial, his familiarity with the indictment, and the 
possible penalty range if convicted.  The court also told him 
that he would be "on your own," without help or guidance from the 
court, and asked if he was familiar with the rules of procedure 
and evidence and the relevant statutory provisions.  The court 
advised Cocivera "from the bottom of my heart, sir," that he 
would be "far better represented by a trained lawyer particularly 
Mr. Bergstrom."  Id. at 117. 
         In response, Cocivera stated that all he really wanted 
was to be able to supplement Bergstrom's knowledge.  "I have no 
reason too [sic] want to represent myself."  Id.  The court then 
repeated the question whether he wanted to represent himself.  
Cocivera responded: "Yes, your Honor."  Id. at 118.  After the 
court found that Cocivera had knowingly and voluntarily waived 
his right to counsel, it permitted him to represent himself, and 
appointed Bergstrom as standby counsel.  Asked if he had further 
comments, Cocivera responded: "No, Your Honor."  Id.   
         When Cocivera was about to begin questioning the next 
witness, the court asked whether he would also represent the 
defendant corporations, and Cocivera replied "yes," to which the 
court appeared to assent.  Id. at 120.  From the record, it 
appears that Bergstrom remained in the courtroom throughout the 
nine day trial.  Following the convictions, new counsel 
represented defendants in presenting a motion for a new trial and 
represents them on this appeal.  
                               III. 
         Cocivera contends that his waiver of his right to 
counsel was not knowing or voluntary in violation of Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  After careful review of the 
record, we conclude that there is ample support for the district 
court's finding to the contrary.  The court engaged in a detailed 
colloquy with Cocivera to determine if he was aware of the 
charges against him and the penalty faced.  The court fully 
explained the dangers of proceeding pro se and strongly urged 
Cocivera not to do so.  We find no abuse in the fact that the 
possibility of so proceeding was first raised by the court.  As 
we stated in Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 
468, 470 (3d Cir. 1991), "if the court determines that good cause 
for substitution of counsel does not exist, the defendant then is 
left with the choice of continuing with existing counsel or 
proceeding to trial pro se."  In rejecting Cocivera's post-trial 
motion for a new trial, the district court noted that Cocivera is 
educated and articulate, and that he was "an intelligent and very 
able advocate," Order of August 8, 1995, a finding fully 
justified by our own reading of the transcript showing Cocivera's 
examination of witnesses and conduct during the trial.  The 
district court also found that Cocivera's timing in raising the 
issue of Bergstrom's allegedly deficient preparation on the 
second day of the trial was a tactical decision.  Inasmuch as the 
trial date had been specially listed and the jury impanelled and 
waiting in the middle of the government's presentation of its 
case, we find no error or abuse of discretion in requiring 
Cocivera to make his decision promptly.   
         Nor do we find merit in Cocivera's argument that his 
waiver of counsel was not timely.  The very cases cited by 
Cocivera belie this argument since they merely state that the 
district court has the discretion to reject a defendant's waiver 
of counsel if it is not timely.  See, e.g., Horton v. Dugger, 895 
F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Oakey, 853 F.2d 
551, 553 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989); 
United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1324-25 (4th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980).  The district court 
had the discretion to allow Cocivera to proceed pro se even 
though the trial had already begun.  Moreover, we note that 
Bergstrom, who had been appointed as standby counsel, was present 
throughout the trial and participated on the record on various 
occasions.  See, e.g., App. at 664 (regarding a possible plea 
agreement), 669 (regarding applicable sentencing guidelines), 
675, 838, 1201 (regarding the use of defense exhibits), 1205 
(regarding certain stipulations), 1206, 1354 (assisting in the 
preparation of motions), 1355. 
         Thus, we reject Cocivera's argument that his waiver of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing 
or intelligent, or timely. 
                               IV. 
         Cocivera claims that the assistance given at trial was 
ineffective.  This court has long followed the practice of 
declining to consider a defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal.  As we have explained in 
our case law, the issue is ordinarily more appropriate for 
collateral attack.  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 
806 F.2d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1986).  This affords the opportunity to 
develop a factual basis for the claim that counsel's performance 
did not meet the standard for effective assistance of counsel.  
United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 
1989).  It also gives the trial court the opportunity to hear 
counsel's explanation for the conduct at issue.  Frequently, the 
direct appeal is handled by the same counsel who handled the 
trial, and it is patent that that counsel cannot forcefully argue 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  United States v. 
DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1544 
(1994). 
         On the other hand, we have recognized that in some 
cases, albeit rare, we may have a sufficient record on appeal to 
decide the issue and avoid the considerable effort of requiring 
the defendant to institute a collateral proceeding in order to 
raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  In Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 1984), 
we determined that the facts regarding the conflict of interest 
issue raised on direct appeal were clear on the record.  
Therefore, we held that under the circumstances of that case an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was cognizable on direct 
appeal.   
         Similarly, in United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 
1083 (3d Cir. 1991), we allowed an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on direct appeal where "an evidentiary hearing to 
develop the facts is not needed," because the record was 
sufficient to show that the attorney failed to raise a sentencing 
adjustment for the defendant being a minor participant in a 
criminal enterprise.  We could find no tactical reason for the 
attorney's failure to raise the adjustment, and thus concluded 
that counsel's ineffective assistance was clear. 
         In this case, we also hold that under the circumstances 
we need not require Cocivera to pursue a collateral proceeding 
before we can rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  The issue was raised by Cocivera on the second day of 
trial, and the district court held a hearing to decide the issue.  
Cocivera presented his claim to the district court cogently, as 
does his counsel on appeal, and Bergstrom explained the reasons 
for his actions and confirmed his preparedness and willingness to 
proceed.  The district court ruled on Cocivera's claim twice - 
once orally when the issue was presented at trial, and again in 
its order of August 8, 1995 rejecting Cocivera's post-trial 
motions.  The issue is thus cognizable in this case on direct 
appeal. 
         Turning to the merits, the district court ruled post 
trial that "Mr. Bergstrom's performance -- both before and after 
Mr. Cocivera waived the right to the assistance of counsel -- was 
highly professional and did not fall below any objective standard 
of reasonableness.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688 (1984)."  Order of August 8, 1995.  We see no reason to 
overturn this ruling, and thus reject Cocivera's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
                                V. 
         The corporations contend that they also did not 
voluntarily or knowingly waive their right to counsel.  In United 
States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d 
Cir. 1979), we considered the parameters of the constitutional 
right to counsel and noted that the "language does not suggest 
that the protection of sixth amendment rights is restricted to 
individual defendants."  We held that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel applies to corporations, saying:   
         [A]n accused has no less of a need for 
         effective assistance due to the fact that it 
         is a corporation.  The purpose of the 
         guarantee is to ensure that the accused will 
         not suffer an adverse judgment or lose the 
         benefit of procedural protections because of 
         ignorance of the law.  A corporation would 
         face these same dangers unless the agent 
         representing it in court is a competent 
         lawyer.  Thus, the right to effective 
         assistance of counsel is not so peculiarly 
         applicable to individuals that corporations 
         should not be entitled to it. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
         Neither counsel in this case has suggested that 
anything in the record indicates, much less demonstrates, that 
Cocivera was authorized by the corporations to substitute himself 
for Bergstrom.  Nor is there any indication in the record that a 
change in representation for the corporations was even discussed 
with other corporate officers.  It may be true, as the government 
argues, that Cocivera effectively ran the corporations and was 
their alter ego, but that does not mean that he had the right to 
decide alone to represent the corporations.  Indeed, the record 
does not show whether Bergstrom's status as standby counsel also 
applied to the corporations, as the entire discussion between the 
district court and Cocivera regarding the corporate 
representation consisted of one simple question and answer. 
         Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[i]t has 
been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a 
corporation may appear in the federal courts only through 
licensed counsel."  Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 
194, 201-02 (1993); see also, Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 
367 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam).   
         The cases cited by the government to support its 
contention that the corporations could proceed without being 
represented by counsel are inapposite.  In In re Victor 
Publishers, Inc., 545 F.2d 285, 286 (1st Cir. 1976) (per curiam), 
the court upheld the general rule that a corporation must be 
represented by licensed counsel.  Although dictum in a footnote 
referred to an earlier First Circuit case, In re Las Colinas, 453 
F.2d 911 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1067 (1972), 
that supposedly made an exception allowing a corporation to be 
represented by a non-lawyer when that individual had demonstrated 
extraordinary legal ability, we find no reference in Las Colinasto 
allowing corporations to be represented by a non-lawyer.  Nor 
could a district court in its later opinion in the ongoing LasColinas 
litigation find the reference to the representation issue 
in the case cited in the Victor footnote.  See Schreibman v. 
Walter E. Heller Co., 446 F. Supp. 141, 144 n.7 (D.P.R.) (holding 
that a corporation could not be represented by a non-lawyer), 
aff'd sub nom. Las Colinas Dev. Corp v. Schreibman, 577 F.2d 723 
(1st Cir. 1978).    
         The government also cites United States v. Reeves, 431 
F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970), for the proposition that a 
partnership's managing partner may represent the partnership when 
state law gives a partner a specific right to the property sought 
to be foreclosed.  However, the Ninth Circuit later held that the 
Supreme Court's Rowland opinion had overruled Reeves "to the 
extent that Reeves stood for the proposition that non-attorney 
members of a partnership could appear on behalf of the 
partnership."  See In re America West Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058, 
1059 (9th Cir. 1994).  In any event, the issue before us is 
representation of a corporation, not a partnership. 
         Similarly, even the decision in In the Matter of 
Holliday's Tax Services, Inc., 417 F.Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),  
aff'd, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979), where the district court 
made a limited exception allowing a small closely-held 
corporation to be represented in bankruptcy proceedings by its 
sole shareholder if the corporation was financially unable to 
hire an attorney, was cited in Rowland as among the "aberrant" 
cases holding contrary to the general rule.  Rowland, 506 U.S. at 
202 n.5. 
         The government's citation to the district court 
decision in Willheim v. Murchison, 206 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962), allowing a stockholder and non-lawyer to represent himself 
and other similarly situated stockholders in a derivative action, 
is surprising in light of the criticism of the reasoning of 
Willheim by the court of appeals of that circuit.  See Phillips 
v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to allow 
a stockholder to file pro se in a derivative suit).   
         We thus find that none of the cases cited by the 
government actually deviate from the general rule that a 
corporation may not be represented by other than licensed 
counsel.  The district court's action in permitting Cocivera to 
represent the corporation ran against almost unbroken precedent.  
See, e.g., Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp., 764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Jones v. Niagara 
Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1983); Southwest 
Express Co., Inc. v. ICC, 670 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam); Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n. v. Board of Appeals of 
Cook County, 543 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  In fact, 
in Rowland the Supreme Court stated of the rare cases holding to 
the contrary: "These cases neither follow federal precedent, nor 
have themselves been followed."  Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202 n.5.  
Moreover, the cases referred to were civil cases and did not 
implicate the central issue here, which is whether a corporation 
may proceed in a trial as a criminal defendant represented by 
someone who is not an attorney.         
         In sum, the corporations in this case were not 
represented by counsel as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.  
We cannot accept the government's argument that the appointment 
of Bergstrom as standby counsel "cured any problem with corporate 
representation in this case."  Appellee brief at 33.  Standby 
counsel cannot remedy the absence of counsel unless s/he 
"provides . . . the mandated assistance . . . ." at all crucial 
stages of the proceedings.  United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 
891 (2d Cir. 1990).  The record does not even show that Bergstrom 
was standby counsel for the corporations.  The district court 
appointed Bergstrom standby counsel for Cocivera as part of the 
decision allowing Cocivera to proceed pro se.  App. at 118.  At 
the time of Cocivera's response to the court that he would also 
represent the corporations, the court said nothing concerning the 
appointment of standby counsel for the corporations.  Id. at 120. 
There is nothing in the court's subsequent reminder to Cocivera 
that "I've appointed Mr. Bergstrom as your standby counsel and 
you should feel free to the extent as you wish, as you have, to 
consult from time to time," id. at 1201, to suggest that 
Bergstrom was standby counsel to the corporations as well as to 
Cocivera.  We have no basis to assume that Bergstrom's 
participation as standby counsel on behalf of Cocivera was also 
on behalf of the corporations.  
         Because we conclude that the six corporations were not 
properly represented in this case, we must vacate their 
convictions and remand for a new trial. 
                               VI. 
         For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the 
conviction and sentence of Cocivera but will vacate the 
convictions of the six corporations and remand for further 
proceedings. 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
